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Abstract: This paper considers a supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer who commits to a 
service level to make end-users happy and promote sales. To reduce the losses resulting from the high 
demand volatility, the retailer purchases put options from the supplier to adjust its initial order. The 
optimal ordering and production policies with and without put options under the service level 
constraint are derived. We find that, in the two cases, the expected profits of the retailer are 
non-increasing in the service level constraint while that of the supplier are non-decreasing in it. Model 
comparison reveals that with put options, the retailer will offer higher service level and earn more 
profit than without; such effect is more salient when the demand is more variable. However, the put 
option contract will not always benefit the supplier especially when the service constraint is high. We 
also find that put option contract can effectively improve the decentralized system’s performance, but 
this only happens when the service constraint is low. In addition, we find that put option contract have 
no better capability than wholesales price contract in coordinating the supply chain in the presence of a 
service level constraint. 
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Perishable products, such as fashion clothing, fresh food, newspapers and air tickets, are also known 
as seasonal products or short life cycle products. Apart from their short life cycle, perishable products 
are also characterized by their long production or ordering lead-time and high demand uncertainty 
(Burnetas and Ritchken, 2005; Li et al.,2014; Chen et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019). Today, with the 
increasing competition, the fast changing consumer preference and the rapidly advancing technology, 
an increasing number of goods have the traits of perishable products (Hu et al., 2014). This 
phenomenon is particularly true in high-tech industry. One example is that an IC chip is likely to lose 
60% of its value within only the first 6 months of its lifecycle (Mallik and Harker, 2004); another 
example we may find is that the demand volatility of a state-of-the-art semiconductor might be as high 
as 80% deviation from the forecast (Wu, 2005). 
On the other hand, in order to gain and maintain competitive advantage in existing or new 
markets, particularly for today’s customer-oriented market, an increasing number of companies are 
promising a high service level (the probability of meeting the customer demand) to satisfy their 
customers and promote sales (Chen et al., 2015; Taleizadeh et al., 2018). Some companies have gone 
so far as to promise a 100% service level. E.g., Dayton Hudson (an apparel company) commits a 100% 
service level to its customers (Sethi et al., 2007). Costless Express, one of Canada’s largest business 
products catalogue retailers, commits 100% to order fill rate and next-business-day delivery to 
customers (Costless Express 2006). However, whether 100% service level is the best choice for all 
companies? In fact, the service level marks a trade-off between opportunity costs and inventory costs. 
The high service level helps companies to collect more revenue, but it is usually accompanied by 
higher inventory risks. Schalit and Vermorel (2014) found that for most retailers, to increase the 
service level from 95% to 97% is vastly more expensive than from 85% to 87%, which means the 
higher the service level the retailer wants to achieve, the more cost it has to bear. Therefore, setting an 
appropriate service level target is important for a company to balance customer satisfaction and 
expected profit. However, it is usually complex and challenging, especially for companies with 
perishable products. One of the typical strategies recognized by scholars and practitioners is to provide 




In recent years, a well-known financial derivative, the real option has become prevalent in supply 
chain to facilitate flexible ordering. The real option was firstly designed to aid capital investment 
decision-making to amplify good fortune or mitigate loss (Lander and Pinches, 1998). Due to its 
intrinsic flexibility, the real option is acknowledged as a powerful tool to evaluate uncertain projects 
and has interested numerous researchers. Various option-type decision-making frameworks have been 
developed to model and value real option. However, such models are usually complex and require 
substantial mathematical techniques to solve. Besides, many of the required modeling assumptions are 
often violated in a real option application. Due to such reasons, these models were not widely used by 
practitioners then (Lander and Pinches, 1998). Fortunately, such research has been carried on and a 
number of more practical frameworks/models and solutions have been proposed. Examples include, 
among others, mobile phone operator (Cassimon, et al., 2011), energy economics (Feng and Ryan 
2013), biopharmaceutical industry (Nigro, et al. 2014) and natural resources extraction (Alonso-Ayuso 
et al. 2014). What’s more, the development of computing technology has gradually removed the 
technical limitations and little by little the real option theory has gained its popularity in capital 
investment. For this reason, both scholars and practitioners have adopted real options to hedge the 
risks of supply chains (Chen et al. 2014). Essentially, real option (here after referred to as option) is a 
special right: by pre-paying a fee, the buyer (retailer) gets the right (not the obligation) to reorder from 
or return goods to the seller (supplier) at a predetermined price on a future date. Based on different 
choices, option contracts can be divided into call option (reorder) contract and put option (return) 
contract (Burnetas and Ritchken, 2005), which are frequently adopted in practice. E.g., to hedge their 
risks, Hewlett-Packard Company (Nagali et al., 2008) and China Telecom Corporation Limited (Chen 
et al., 2014) adopt call option contracts while Enron (Chen and Parlar, 2007) adopts put option 
contracts. Among these examples, the most commonly acknowledged one is the risk management 
program launched by Hewlett-Packard in 2000. By adopting call option contracts to tackle the joint 
uncertainty in demand, cost and availability for key components such as memory chips and flat-panels, 
the company is reported to have achieved approximately $425 million in cumulative cost savings 
during the period of 2000-2006 (Nagali et al., 2008). Such examples suggest that option contracts are 
of great applicability and there’s no doubt that they will be popular in the future. In the literature, the 
issues on supply chains management with call option contracts have been well-studied. As is shown in 




perspectives by some researchers, but none of them have considered the service level constraint. 
Motivated by these observations, our study addresses the following questions in the context of a 
supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer with a service level constraint: 
(1) What are optimal operational decisions (e.g., the retailer’s order quantity and the supplier’s 
production quantity) with put option contract? 
(2) How does the service level constraint influence the supply chain members’ operational 
decisions and performances? 
(3) What impact do put options have on the decisions and performances of the supply chain?  
(4) Can the supply chain be coordinated under the put option contract? 
Our study offers three contributions. First, we extend the supply chain models to incorporate both 
put option contract and the service level constraint. We derive the optimal ordering policies as well as 
the optimal production policies with and without put options. Besides, we discuss the effect of the 
service level constraint on the members’ performance. It is shown that, in two cases, the expected 
profits of the retailer are non-increasing in the service level constraint while that of the supplier are 
non-decreasing in it. Finally, for each part, we examine the value of the put option. We find that with 
put options, the retailer will offer higher service level and earns more profit than without them, such 
effect is more salient when the demand is more variable. However, the put option contract will not 
always benefit the supplier especially when the service constraint is high. We also find that put option 
contract can effectively improve the decentralized system’s performance, but this only happens when 
the service constraint is low. In addition, we find that the put option contract do not have any 
superiority as compared to the wholesale price contract in coordinating the supply chain in the 
presence of a service level constraint. 
After a brief literature review in §2, we detail model assumptions and formulation in §3. In §4 we 
develop model to derive and analyze the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the supplier’s 
production policy. In §5, the effects of the service level constraint as well as put option contract on the 
supply chain is discussed. In §6, the supply chain coordination is discussed. §7 summarizes our 






2 Literature review 
This work is associated to several research streams in the supply chain management literature. Here, 
we focus on two most relevant streams: service level constraints and put option contracts, which are 
elaborated in the following discussion. 
The supply chains management with service level constraints has drawn much attention from the 
academic circle. Several authors have incorporated service level constraints into the classic 
multi-echelon inventory control model. Usually, they derive the optimal stock levels for each stocking 
location in the presence of service level constraints by adopting base-stock policies and developing 
optimal or heuristic procedures (Bollapragada et al., 2004;Tarim et al., 2011;Wang et al., 2013; Tunc 
et al., 2014; Woerner et al., 2018). For more detailed literature review on this, readers may refer to the 
works of Bijvank and Vis (2012) and Woerner et al. (2018). There is a rapidly growing body of 
literature focusing on solving optimization problems with service level constraints in supply chain 
context, which is more relevant to the issue that we are addressing. Ernst and Powell (1998) studied a 
distribution system in which a manufacturer provides financial incentives to the retailer to improve its 
service level. Sethi et al. (2007) investigated a two-level supply chain with demand forecast updates. 
The buyer has a replenishment opportunity and commits to a service level after demand forecast 
updates upon the observation of the market signal. They found that both the optimal order quantity of 
the first-stage and the maximum expected profit are monotone with the target service level. Finally, 
they extended their analysis to the situation when an order cancellation is allowed and the channel 
coordination issue. Elena et al.(2008) considered a supplier who delivers goods to a retailer through 
stocking. The supplier commits to achieve a minimum fill rate (service level agreement) over a 
specified time horizon. They concentrated on the impact of the magnitude of the bonus for meeting or 
exceeding the service level target and the length of the review period. Li et al. (2011) proposed a price 
discount mechanism to coordinate a supply chain composed of a vendor and a buyer who faces service 
level constraints. Jha and Shanker (2013) considered a context in which a vendor supplies production 
to a set of buyers. They presented an integrated production-inventory model which includes service 
level constraints corresponding to each buyer to find the optimal order quantity, lead time and safety 
factor of the buyers simultaneously. Considering disruption risk and risk-aversion in a supply chain, 




rate and the demand fulfillment rate) to study the worst-case optimization of service level. All the 
studies reviewed above  do not take option contracts into consideration.  
The literature on supply chain with option contracts is abundant but mainly focuses on call option 
contracts, such as Barnes-Schuster et al., (2002), Nagali et al., (2008), Fu et al., (2012), Hu et al., 
(2014), Wang and Chen (2015, 2017), Wang et al., (2017), Luo and Chen (2017), Wan and Chen 
(2018), Benyong et al., (2018) and Chen and Wan (2019). Here the review mainly concentrates on the 
studies on supply chains with put option contracts. Burnetas and Ritchken (2005) investigated the 
pricing of put option in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer with a downward 
sloping demand curve. They focused on how the wholesale price and strike price adjust after the 
introduction of put option contracts. They found that the wholesale price will not readjust in such case 
if there’s the range in which the strike prices are curtailed. They also found that in some cases the put 
option contracts may hurt the retailer. Liu et al. (2013) examined the value of put option contracts in a 
two-echelon container shipping service chain with capacity and order constraints. Recently, 
considering the case that both demand and cost are uncertainty, Nosoohi and Nookabadi (2016) 
investigated the outsourcing model with put option. Wang and Chen (2018) studied the ordering and 
retail price policies of fresh products under put option contracts. In addition, Chen and Parlar (2007) 
studied the value of a put option in a single-period inventory model, in which the risk-averse 
newsvendor not only chooses the order quantity but also determines the “strike quantity” and/or the 
“strike price” of the put option. They found that the optimal order quantity will not change with or 
without the put option. They also found that the news vendor’s maximum expected profit are not 
affected by the strike price and strike quantity which however do affect profit variance. It’s worth 
noting the major differences between their work and our paper. On the hand, the put option in their 
model can enable the buyer to make profit only when the actual demand is smaller than the strike 
quantity (option order quantity). On the other hand, in their study, the part which can be resold to the 
option writer or be compensated by the option writer is the gap between the demand and the strike 
quantity. In contrast, in our paper, the part that can be resold to the supplier can be up to the strike 
quantity whatever the relationship of the demand and the strike quantity is. In a nutshell, the previous 
researchers have studied the role of put option contracts in a supply chain from different situations.  
The above review shows that both service level constraints and put option contracts have been 




investigate these two important issues in separate contexts. Different to those studies on put options in 
supply chain (Liu et al., 2013; Nosoohi and Nookabadi; 2016; Wang and Chen 2018), we incorporate 
both put option contract and the service level constraint in our modelling and find that the effort of put 
option contracts on the supply chain members’ performance is subject to the service level constraint. 
Different to the studies (Chen and Shen 2012; Chen et al., 2017) that consider option contracts in the 
presence of service level constraints such as Chen and Shen  (2012) focused on the call option and 
Chen et al. (2017) concentrated on the bidirectional option, we mainly deal with put option contracts. 
Moreover, we also discuss the coordination of the supply chain under put option contracts in the 
presence of service level constraints. 
 
3 Model assumptions and formulation 
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer. The retailer 
orders products from the supplier and sells to end-user sunder a service level constraint in a single 
selling period. In addition to placing an initial firm order, the retailer can purchase put options from 
the supplier. The put option is characterized by two parameters, namely, the option price and the 
exercise price. Each put option gives the retailer the right but not the obligation to return one unit to 
the supplier at the exercise price after demand is observed. In this paper, we focus on how the service 
level constraint and put options affect the retailer’s ordering decision and the supplier’s production 
decision. Therefore, all cost and profit parameters are assumed as exogenous. This assumption is 
reasonable, especially when selling/contract parameters are determined by supply chain firms in 
advance and ordering/production quantities and delivery conditions are negotiated later (see 
Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002; Li et al, 2011; Huet al, 2014). Besides, considering the current market 
environment where many retailers play a more dominant role than their suppliers in the supply chain, 
we assume the retailer is the leader and the supplier is the follower. 
The sequence of events will be as follows. Before the beginning of the production period, the 
retailer determines how many products to order initially and how many put options to purchase 
according to the preliminary demand forecast and the service level constraint. During the production 
period, the supplier produces according to the retailer’s initial firm order. At the beginning of the 




the actual demand is realized and the retailer manages to meet it with products on hand. After the 
selling period, the retailer excises the put options, and any leftover for the retailer and the supplier can 
be salvaged at the same specific price. The main model notations in this paper are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The notations 
𝐷 Random variable representing market demand during the selling period, 𝐷 ≥ 0; 
𝑓(𝑥) Probability density function of 𝐷; 
𝐹(𝑥) Cumulative distribution function of 𝐷; 
𝑤1 Unit wholesale price ($); 
𝑤2 Unit option exercise price($); 
𝑏 Unit option price ($); 
𝑞 Firm order quantity of the retailer; 
𝑞1 Put option order quantity of the retailer, 𝑞1 < 𝑞; 
𝛼 Retailer’s service level commitment, 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 1; 
𝑄 Production quantity of the supplier; 
𝑐 Unit production cost($); 
𝑝 Unit retail price ($); 
𝑠 Unit salvage value after the selling period($); 
We further assume that both the retailer and the manufacturer are rational and self-interested and 
each firm is risk-neutral. Meanwhile symmetric information is assumed, i.e. at the beginning of the 
game, both firms hold the same information, which means all parameters and rules are known by each 
firm. Besides, to avoid an unrealistic case, we require that 𝑞1 < 𝑞, 𝑤2 > 𝑏 + 𝑠, 𝑝 > 𝑤1 + 𝑏 and 
𝑤1 + 𝑏 + 𝑠 > 𝑤2 + 𝑐.The first condition avoids the situation that the returned product quantity exceed 
the retailer’s purchase. The second condition ensures the retailer to make profit. The third condition 
assures the incentive for the retailer to purchase put options. Similarly the fourth condition assures the 
supplier’s profit and there is, otherwise, no incentive for the supplier to produce the product or accept 
put option contract. For clarity, superscripts ‘s’ (supplier) and ‘r’ (retailer) are adopted to differentiate 





4 Optimal ordering policy and production policy with put options 
In this section, we develop models to analyze the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the supplier’s 
optimal production policy under put option contract in the presence of a service level constraint. In 
this context, the retailer has two decision variables: 𝑞(the quantity of firm order) and 𝑞1 (the quantity 
of put option). The expected profit of the retailer, denoted 𝜋𝑟(𝑞, 𝑞1), is 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞, 𝑞1) = 𝑝𝐸[min(𝑞, 𝐷)] + 𝑤2𝐸min[𝑞1, (𝑞 − 𝐷)
+] + 𝑠𝐸[(𝑞 − 𝑞1 − 𝐷)
+] − 𝑤1𝑞 − 𝑏𝑞1 
The first three terms above refer to the expected revenue from selling the products to customers, 
from exercising put options and from salvage of the leftover, respectively. The last two terms capture 
the costs of firm order and put options purchase, respectively. Then 
              𝜋𝑟(𝑞, 𝑞1) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞 − (𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞
0




The retailer solves the following problem under put option contract in the presence of the service 




s. t. 𝑃𝑟{𝑞 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼   (2) 
Equation (2) indicates that 𝑞 > 𝐹−1(𝛼) and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). It’s clear that  𝑞𝛼 is increasing in 𝛼. 
Noting that in the above model, we use a service level constraint instead of the shortage cost because 
the product shortage affects the service level, which results in lost sales cost; furthermore, practically 
customers will not ask the firms to provide a 100% service level though a certain service level is 
required. Thus, we have the following lemma. 
Lemma 1.With put options, the retailer’s optimal firm order quantity 𝒒∗  and option order 
quantity𝒒𝟏
∗ in the presence of the service level constraint satisfies: 
                                                                    𝒒∗ = {
𝒒𝜸       𝒊𝒇𝜶 < 𝛾 
 𝒒𝜶       𝒊𝒇𝜶 ≥ 𝜸 
.(3) 
                                                                    𝒒𝟏







and 𝒒𝜸 = 𝑭−𝟏 (
𝒑−𝒘𝟏−𝒃
𝒑−𝒘𝟐
)are the maximum service level and the optimal firm order 
quantity of the retailer with put options in the case of without any constraints, respectively.  
This lemma characterizes the optimal ordering policy of the retailer with the service level 
constraint and put options. It is shown that, if 𝛼 is lower than 𝛾, then the service level constraint is 




service level constraint is binding and the retailer should order quantity as the service level constraint 
(𝑞𝛼). Moreover, it’s worth noting that𝑞1
𝛾
> 0is equivalent to 𝑏 <
(𝑝−𝑤1)(𝑤2−𝑠)
𝑝−𝑠
, which shows that the 
retailer will order no options at all if the option price 𝑏is too high. 
Assuming that the demand is normally distributed and the standarddeviationis 𝜎, we have the 
following corollary. 
Corollary 1.  𝒒𝟏
∗  is non-increasing in 𝒘𝟏, decreasing in 𝒃, and increasing in 𝒘𝟐 and 𝝈. 
Corollary 1 reveals that when the wholesale price  𝑤1 decreases, the retailer will maintain or 
increases its option order according to the service level constraint. If the option price 𝑏 decreases, the 




∗ ) is decreasing in  𝒘𝟏 and 𝒃, and increasing in 𝒘𝟐. 
This corollary shows that with put options, the retailer’s maximum expected profit will decrease 
if the wholesale price or the option price increases. However, the maximum expected profit of the 
retailer will increase if the option exercising price increases. Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 show that our 
study can give significant managerial insights into pricing (wholesale price, option price and 
exercising price) though all price parameters are assumed exogenous in this paper. 
In what follows, we consider the supplier’s optimal production policy. Although the retailer may 
exercise part of or all the put options (return the leftover to the supplier), the supplier will deliver the 
quantity of the retailer orders at the beginning of the selling season, which means that the supplier has 
to produce the exact quantity the retailer orders. Therefore, we have the following proposition.  
Lemma 2. With put options, the supplier’s optimal production quantity in the presence of a service 
level constraint is 
     𝑸∗ = 𝒒∗ = {
𝒒𝜸       𝒊𝒇𝜶 < 𝛾 
 𝒒𝜶       𝒊𝒇𝜶 ≥ 𝜸 
.(5) 




∗) =  𝑤1𝑞
∗ + 𝑏𝑞1
∗ + 𝑠𝐸min[𝑞1
∗, (𝑞∗ − 𝐷)+] − 𝑐𝑞∗ − 𝑤2𝐸min[𝑞1
∗, (𝑞∗ − 𝐷)+]. 
The first three terms are the expected revenue from firm orders, option sales and salvage of the 
returned products from the retailer, respectively. The fourth term is the production cost and the last 





∗) = ( 𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞
∗ + 𝑏𝑞1





5 The effect of service level constraint and put option contract 
The previous subsection derives the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the supplier’s optimal 
production policy as well as their maximum expected profit with service level and put options. In this 
section, we examine the effects of the service level constraint and put options on the supply chain. 
Firstly, in order to establish a performance benchmark, we consider the base case of without put 
options (wholesale price contract). Assume that the retailer places a firm order 𝑞0 from the supplier 
before the beginning of the production season, and then we can know that he expected profit of the 
retailer, denoted 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0),  
                                               𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞0 − (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑞0
0
.                   (7) 





                                                                        s. t.  𝑃𝑟{𝑞0 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼.        (8) 
Equation (8) indicates that 𝑞0 > 𝐹
−1(𝛼)and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). It’s clear that  𝑞𝛼 is increasing in 𝛼. 











, which is the maximum service level without any constraints, then 𝑞0
𝛽
≡ 𝐹−1(𝛽). 




,  𝑞𝛼), that is,  




       𝑖𝑓𝛼 < 𝛽 
 𝑞𝛼       𝑖𝑓𝛼 ≥ 𝛽 
.                           (10) 
It is shown that, if 𝛼 is lower than 𝛽, then the service level constraint is not binding and the 
retailer will order to achieve its maximum profit. If 𝛼 is higher than 𝛽, then the service level 
constraint is binding and the retailer should order quantity as the service level constraint (𝑞𝛼). 
From Equation (7), we find that the retailer’s maximum expected profit is 𝜋𝑟
0( 𝑞0
∗) = (𝑝 −
𝑤1)𝑞0
𝛽












∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1) 𝑞
𝛼 − (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
 𝑞𝛼
0
. In addition, the supplier’s 
optimal production quantity (denoted as 𝑄0
∗) is 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗ . The maximum expected profit of the 




∗) = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞0
∗. 
5.1The effect of a service level constraint 
Here, we consider the effect of the service level constraint on the optimal policies and the expected 
profit of the supply chain. 
Proposition1.  𝒒∗ , 𝒒𝟏
∗ and 𝒒𝟎
∗  are non-decreasing in 𝜶 , but  𝝅𝒓(𝒒
∗, 𝒒𝟏
∗ ) and 𝝅𝒓
𝟎( 𝒒𝟎
∗ ) are 
non-increasing in α. 
Proposition1states that as the service level constraint 𝛼 increases, the retailer’s optimal order 
quantity with and without put options will not decrease, which is consistent with the intuition that a 
higher service level constraint requires more initial order of the retailer and meanwhile the option 
order will increase. However, increasing the service level can improve customer satisfaction and 
promote sales, while incur a higher inventory risk. From this proposition, we can see that the retailer’s 
expected profit will not increase as the service level constraint 𝛼 increases, instead, it will decrease 
especially when the service level constraint is binding (𝛼 ≥ 𝛾 for the case with put options, 𝛼 ≥ 𝛽 for 
the case of without). On the one hand, a high service level improves customer satisfaction and 
therefore increases customer demand. On the other hand, a high service level requires the retailer to 
held sufficient inventory and therefore to increase the quantities of firm order and put options. 
Meanwhile, the large quantities of firm order and put option orders push up the cost and therefore 
reduce the profit margin of the retailer. The proposition demonstrates that there is a trade-off between 
customer satisfaction and operational cost. It is important to strike a balance between the two when 
retailers make the strategic decision on service level and operationalize the strategy.  
Proposition 2. 𝑸∗ and 𝑸𝟎
∗  are non-decreasing in α, 𝝅𝒔(𝑸
∗) and  𝝅𝒔
𝟎(𝑸𝟎
∗ ) are non-decreasing in 
α. 
From Proposition2, we find that as the service level constraint increases, the optimal production 
quantity and the expected profit of the supplier will not decrease in both cases (with and without put 
options). This proposition reveals that the service level constraint is always beneficial to the supplier 
because the high service level constraint requires the retailer to order larger quantity of products and 




end consumers and contributes to the expansion of market share. Therefore, from the supplier’s 
perspective, a high service level increases customer demand and enhances its competitiveness.  
5.2 The effect of put option contract 
In this subsection, we examine the effect of put option contract on the optimal ordering policies and 
the expected profit of the supply chain. Comparing the models between the cases of with and without 
put option contract, we get the following propositions. 
Proposition3. If 𝜶 < 𝛾, then 𝒒∗ > 𝒒𝟎
∗ ;if 𝜶 ≥ 𝜸, then 𝒒∗ = 𝒒𝟎
∗ . 
Proposition 3 indicates that if the service level constraint 𝛼 is lower than 𝛾, the firm order 
quantity with put options will be higher than that of without, whereas if 𝛼 is higher than 𝛾 or equal 
to  𝛾, there is no difference in the retailer’s firm order quantity between the two cases. It reveals that 
when the service level constraint is low (𝛼 < 𝛾), the put option contract can induce the retailer to order 
more and provide a higher service level than without. This occurs because, by purchasing put options, 
the retailer obtains the right to return some unsold products to the supplier. Therefore, the retailer will 
place a larger firm order to avoid loss from product shortage and can also reduce the cost of excessive 
inventory by exercising the put options. Nevertheless, when the service level constraint is high (𝛼 ≥
𝛾), the optimal order quantity is the same under the two cases. 
Proposition4. For any 𝜶, 𝝅𝒓(𝒒
∗, 𝒒𝟏
∗ ) > 𝝅𝒓
𝟎(𝒒𝟎
∗ ), and ∆= 𝝅𝒓(𝒒
∗, 𝒒𝟏
∗ ) − 𝝅𝒓
𝟎(𝒒𝟎
∗ ) is increasing in 𝝈. 
Proposition 4 suggests that whatever the service level constraint is, the maximum expected 
profit of the retailer with put option contract is larger than that of without. It shows that with put 
options, the retailer will always earn more profits than without, and this is not affected by the 
constraint of the service level. Combining Propositions 3 and 4, it is clear that put option contract 
cannot only help the retailer improve the service level but also increase the profit. It further reveals 
that by adopting put options, the retailer can effectively deal with the risk of demand uncertainty and 
simultaneously achieve the profits and service level. More importantly, the value of put options will 
increase as the demand variability increases. That is, the retailer will benefit more from put options 
when the demand is more volatile. 
Now we look at the effect of put option contract on the supplier’s optimal production policy and 
expected profit. By comparing the equilibrium of the two models, we have the following two 
propositions. 
Proposition 5. If 𝜶 < 𝛾, then 𝑸∗ > 𝑸𝟎





From Proposition 5, we can see that the supplier’s optimal production quantity with put option 
contract is equal to that of without if the service level constraint 𝛼 is higher than 𝛾 or equal to 𝛾, 
whereas if 𝛼 is lower than 𝛾, the optimal production quantity with put option contract will be higher 
than that of without. It follows that supplier’s optimal production quantity with put options contract is 
always no less than that of without. Proposition 3 shows that the production quantity increases due to 
the increased order quantity. 
Proposition6. There is 𝜶𝟎 ∈ (𝜷, 𝜸) , if 𝜶 < 𝜶𝟎 , then  𝝅𝒔(𝑸
∗) >  𝝅𝒔
𝟎(𝑸𝟎
∗ ) ; if 𝜶 ≥ 𝜶𝟎 , then 
𝝅𝒔(𝑸
∗) ≤  𝝅𝒔
𝟎(𝑸𝟎
∗ ). 
Proposition 6 states there is a threshold value  𝛼0 within (𝛽, 𝛾) (γand 𝛽are the maximum 
service level with and without put option contract in the case of without any constraints, respectively), 
if the service level constraint 𝛼 is lower than 𝛼0 or equal to 𝛼0, then the maximum expected profit of 
the supplier with put option contract is larger than that of without, but if 𝛼 is higher than 𝛼0, then the 
maximum expected profit of the supplier with put option contract is smaller than that of without. It 
suggests that with put option contract, the supplier will not always earn more profits than without, and 
whether the supplier can benefit from the put option contract depends on the service level constraint α. 
Only when the service level constraint is low (𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0), the supplier under put option contract will be 
better off than without. Under this context, the supplier will be willing to apply/accept the put option 
contract; otherwise, the supplier will not embrace it. In other words, the service level constraint (𝛼) the 
retailer promised is a key factor that determines whether the supplier should adopt put option contract. 
Furthermore, we look at the impact of the put option contract on the total profit of the supply 
chain and have the following proposition. 
Proposition 7. If 𝜶 < 𝛾, then 𝝅𝒓(𝒒
∗, 𝒒𝟏
∗ ) + 𝝅𝒔(𝑸
∗) > 𝝅𝒓(𝒒𝟎
∗ ) + 𝝅𝒔(𝑸𝟎





∗ ) + 𝝅𝒔(𝑸𝟎
∗ ). 
Proposition 7 shows that if the service level constraint 𝛼 is lower than  γ, the maximum total 
expected profit of the whole supply chain with put option contract is larger than that of without it; if 
the service level constraint 𝛼 is not lower than 𝛾, the maximum total expected profit of the whole 
supply chain with put option contract is equivalent to that of without it. It implies that whether the 
performance of the whole supply chain can be improved by the put option contract also depends on the 
service level constraint 𝛼. When the service level constraint is lower than the threshold (𝛼 < 𝛾), the 




make no difference. 
Further, combining with Propositions 4, 6, and 7 we can conclude that when the service level 
constraint is lower than the threshold (𝛼 < 𝛾), the win-win situation can be achieved by put option 
contract if the retailer is willing to compensate the supplier in the case that the supplier is worse off 
from the put option contract (𝛼 ≥ 𝛼0).However, under the case (α ≥ γ) that the put option contract do 
not make any difference, the best contract for the supply chain is the wholesale price contract due to its 
simplicity. 
 
6 Supply chain coordination 
This section focuses on supply chain coordination in the presence of a service level constraint. We first 
discuss the centralized solution of the integrated supply chain. To optimize the system-wide expected 
profit for the supply chain, we take the supply chain system as a centralized entity. Assume that the 
production quantity of the centralized entity is 𝑄𝐼, and then the expected profit of the integrated 
supply chain, denoted Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼), is 
 Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼) = 𝑝𝐸[min(𝑄𝐼 , 𝐷)] + 𝑠𝐸[(𝑄𝐼 − 𝐷)
+] − 𝑐𝑄𝐼. 
The first two terms are the expected revenue and expected salvage value, respectively. The last 
term is the production cost. Then 








                                                                           s. t.  𝑃𝑟{𝑄𝐼 ≥ 𝐷} ≥ 𝛼.   (12) 
From Equation (12), we get 𝑞 > 𝐹−1(𝛼)and 𝑞𝛼 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛼). Clearly, 𝑞𝛼is increasing in 𝛼. 
Equation (11) shows that
𝑑Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)
𝑑𝑄𝐼
= (𝑝 − 𝑐) − (𝑝 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑄𝐼)and
𝑑2Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)
𝑑𝑄𝐼
2 = −(𝑝 − 𝑠)𝑓(𝑄𝐼) < 0 . 
Thus, Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)is concave in 𝑄𝐼. Set
𝑑Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼)
𝑑𝑄𝐼
= 0, we can get the optimal production quantity of the 
centralized entity without service level constraints is 
  𝑄𝐼




Now set 𝜏 =
𝑝−𝑐
𝑝−𝑠





𝜏 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝜏). Therefore, the optimal production quantity of the integrated supply 
chain with a service level 𝛼 is 𝑄𝐼
∗ = max(𝑄𝐼




𝜏       𝑖𝑓𝛼 < 𝜏 
 𝑞𝛼       𝑖𝑓𝛼 ≥ 𝜏 
.(14) 
It is shown that, if 𝛼 is lower than 𝜏, then the service level constraint is not binding and the 
integrated supply chain will production to achieve the maximum profit. If 𝛼 is higher than 𝜏, then the 
service level constraint is binding and the integrated supply chain should production quantity as the 
service level constraint (𝑞𝛼). 
As shown in Equation (14), when 𝛼 < 𝜏, 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑄𝐼
𝜏, which implies thatΠ𝐼(𝑄𝐼) is constant in 𝛼. 
When 𝛼 ≥ 𝜏,  𝑄𝐼
∗ =  𝑞𝛼, then we can see that Π𝐼(𝑄𝐼) is decreasing in the service constraints 𝛼. It 
follows that the maximum expected profit of the integrated supply chain is non-increasing in the 
service level 𝛼. 
From the analysis above, we can obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition8. If 𝛼 < 𝜏 ,the supply chain cannot be coordinated with and without put options; if 
𝜶 ≥  𝝉, the supply chain can be coordinated in both cases. 
Proposition 8suggeststhat the service level constraint is the key determinant of the supply chain 
coordination. If the service level constraint𝛼is lower than 𝜏 (the maximum service level of the 
integrated supply chain without any constraints), the coordination of the supply chain cannot be 
achieved with or without put option contract. However, if the service level constraint is higher than 𝜏, 
the coordination of the supply chain can be achieved in both cases. It reveals that with a service level 
constraint, the put option contracts do not have any superiority in coordinating the supply chain than 
the wholesale price contract. 
 
7 Numerical examples 
To illustrate the developed model numerically, we assume that the demand 𝐷 is normally distributed 
with 𝜇 =100 and 𝜎 =30 during the selling season. Other parameters are as follows: 𝑤1 =20$, 𝑏 =4$, 
𝑤2 =18$, 𝑝 =40$, 𝑠 =3$ and 𝑐 =4$. The effects of the service level constraint 𝛼 on the retailer’s 
optimal order quantity ( 𝑞∗, 𝑞0





    
Figure. 1. Effects of service level constraint 𝜶 on decision and profits. 
The maximum service level with and without options in the context of without any constraints is 
0.72 (𝛾) and 0.54 (𝛽), respectively. Figure 1a confirms what were discussed in Proposition 1 and 5, 
namely, both the retailer’s optimal order quantity 𝑞∗ and 𝑞0
∗ are non-decreasing in 𝛼, specially, if 𝛼 
is lower than 0.72, then  𝑞∗ will be higher than 𝑞0
∗, whereas if 𝛼 is equal to or beyond 0.72, there is 
no difference between 𝑞∗and 𝑞0
∗. Figure 1b confirms what were discussed in Proposition 1 and 6, that 
is, both the retailer’s expected profit  𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) and  𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
∗) are non-increasing in 𝛼 , and the 
expected profit of the retailer with put options is larger than that of without.  
Figure 1c confirms what were discussed in Proposition 2 and 8, the expected profit of the 
supplier 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) and 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) are non-decreasing in 𝛼. Moreover, there is a threshold value 0.59, if 𝛼 
is lower than it, then 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is larger than 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗), but if 𝛼 is higher than 0.59, then 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is 
smaller than 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗). Figure 1d confirms what were discussed in Proposition 7, that is, if the service 
level constraint 𝛼 is lower than 0.72, the total expected profit of the whole supply chain with put 
options Π is larger than that of without Π0; if the service level constraint 𝛼 is beyond or equal to 0.72, 
Π is equivalent to Π0. 
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We assume that the retailer sets its initial (non-optimal) service level at 𝛼 =0.7 and further run 
experiments to study the effects of option price 𝑏 and exercise price 𝑤2 on the decision and profits 
of the supply chain by setting b ={2.5$, 3$, 3.5$, 4$, 4.5$, 5$} and  w2 ={15$, 16$, 17$, 18$, 19$, 
20$}, respectively. The results are illustrated by Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
      
Figure. 3. Effects of exercise price 𝒘𝟐 on decision and profits. 
Figure 2a (3a) and 2b (3b) confirm what were discussed in Corollary 1 and 2, that is, as the 
option price 𝑏 increases (or exercise price 𝑤2 decreases), the retailer will decrease its option order 
𝑞1
∗ and firm order 𝑞∗, which will eventually result in less profit. However, the firm order quantity and 
expected profit of the retailer with options are still larger than that of without. The decline in the 
retailer’s firm order will certainly lead to the decrease in the production of the supplier. Therefore, 
from Figure 2c (3c), it can be observed that the expected profit of the supplier 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) will decrease if 
the option price 𝑏 increases (or exercise price 𝑤2 decreases).  
Figure 2d (3d) reveals that, from the supply chain perspective, the high option price 𝑏 (or high 
exercise price 𝑤2) is unfavorable. Therefore, when maximizing its own profit by setting a reasonable 
option price or/and exercise price, the retailer should take the profit of the supply chain into full 
consideration so as to minimize the loss of the supply chain’s performance. In addition, Figure 2c (3c) 
and 2d (3d) show that under such circumstance (0.59<  𝛼 <0.72), although the expected profit of the 
supplier with options 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is lower than that of without 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗), the whole supply chain with 
options will be better off than without. It confirms what were discussed in Proposition 7. 
Options contracts including put option are increasingly employed by firms across various 
industrial sectors such as energy, commodities, telecommunication and technology to manage demand 
uncertainty and hedge against the associated risks. Although we do not have a specific industry in 
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results offer important managerial implications that can be utilized as strategic and operational 
guidance for firms to implement put option contract. For instance, the China Telecom Corporation 
Limited has recently considered applying the methodology to its purchasing strategy management of 
printed circuit board assembly. For the China Telecom Corporation Limited, the contract parameters of 
printed circuit board assembly are determined in advance, and the ordering quantities are negotiated 
with the supplier later. Furthermore, the delivery related service level (e.g., conditions and time) are 
critical regarding the supply of printed circuit board assembly. In this case, the China Telecom 
Corporation Limited can use the proposed models to optimize their supply chain decisions by setting 
the model parameters according to their specific circumstance. 
 
8 Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
We study a supply chain that consists of a supplier and a retailer who commits to a service level (𝛼) to 
ensure customer service and customer demand. In order to reduce its down-ward risk, the retailer can 
purchase put options from the supplier. In this paper, we focus on the value of put option contacts on 
the supply chain management. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to consider both put 
option contacts and the service level constraint in the supply chain. Our research provides several 
interesting observations. 
Observation 1: With the service level constraint, there are unique optimal solutions for both the 
retailer’s order policies and supplier’s production policies with and without put option contacts. 
Particularly, when the service level constraint (𝛼 ) is lower than the maximum service level 
corresponding to the retailer’s optimal order quantity (𝛽 for the case without option contracts and 𝛾 
for the case with option contracts), the service level constraint is not binding and the retailer orders to 
achieve its maximum profit. Otherwise, the retailer should order quantity as per service level 
constraints (𝑞𝛼) in both cases. This observation provides some insights into the ordering strategy of 
the retailer and the production strategy of the supplier under the put option contact in the presence of 
the service level constraint. 
Observation 2: In both cases (with and without the put option contract), the optimal order 
quantity of the retailer is non-decreasing in the service level constraint but the expected profit of the 




the supplier are non-decreasing in the service level constraint. This finding shows that high service 
level can always benefit the supplier. Therefore, the supplier would also prefer the retailer with a 
higher service level. However, for the retailer, it needs to balance the trade-off between the high 
customer satisfaction and the low expected profit. This observation offers significant insights into the 
retailer’s service level strategy when there’re simultaneous challenges to reduce down-ward risk and 
increase service level.  
Observation 3: With the put option contract, the retailer will offer higher service level and earn 
more profit than without it, such effect is more salient when the demand is more volatile. However, 
whether the supplier can benefit from the put option contract depends on the service level constraint 𝛼. 
Only when the service level constraint is lower than the critical threshold (𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0), the supplier with 
the put option contract will be better off than without it. We also find that put option contract can 
effectively improve the decentralized system’s performance, but this only applies to the scenario that 
the service constraint is not higher than the threshold (𝛼 < 𝛾).Under this case, the win-win situation 
can be achieved by the put option contract if the retailer is will to redistribute the profit gained from 
the put option contract. However, in the case of (𝛼 ≥ 𝛾), the best solution for the whole supply chain 
system is stick with the wholesale price contract due to its simplicity. Moreover, our study also shows 
that with a service level constraint, the put option contract does not demonstrate any superiority in 
coordinating the supply chain as compared to the conventional wholesale price contract. This study 
provides broad opportunities for future research. First, a natural extension of our work is to consider 
more general supply chains, such as multi-suppliers and/or multi-retailers models (Choi, 2016.). 
Second, both the retailer and the supplier are assumed to be risk-neutral in our model. One possible 
extension of this work is to include other attitudes toward risks (such as loss aversion) of the decision 
maker. Finally, the study only considers the demand uncertainty. Another future extension is to 
incorporate the supply uncertainty in the modeling.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: Equation (1) shows that 
 𝜕𝜋𝑟(𝑞,𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞




= −𝑏 + (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞 − 𝑞1) ，  
𝜕2 𝜋𝑟(𝑞,𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞2




























then  𝑞𝛾 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑝−𝑤1−𝑏
𝑝−𝑤2





) − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
) . Set  𝛾 =
𝑝−𝑤1−𝑏
𝑝−𝑤2
, then  𝑞𝛾 ≡ 𝐹−1(𝛾) . 
Therefore,  𝑞∗ = max( 𝑞𝛾,  𝑞𝛼), that is, 𝑞∗ = {
𝑞𝛾       𝑖𝑓𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 
 𝑞𝛼       𝑖𝑓𝛼 > 𝛾 
, and 𝑞1





Proof of Corollary 1: Assume that the demand is normally distributed and the standard deviation is 𝜎. Denote 
the probability density function and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution as ∅ 
and Φ, respectively.  (1) When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛾 , Lemma 1 implies that 𝑞1












































> 0. In addition, Let 𝑧𝛾 = Φ−1 (
𝑝−𝑤1−𝑏
𝑝−𝑤2
), we obtain 𝑞𝛾 = 𝜇 + 𝜎𝑧𝛾, where 𝑧𝛾 is the optimal 
quantile. Let 𝑧1 = Φ−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
), from the Equation (3), we have  𝑞1








) − Φ−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
) > 0. So 𝑞1
∗ is decreasing in 𝑤1and 𝑏, and increasing in 𝑤2 and 𝜎. (2) When 𝛼 > 𝛾, 
Lemma 1 implies that 𝑞1

























> 0. So 𝑞1
∗ is not affected by  𝑤1 but decreasing in 𝑏, and increasing in 𝑤2. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: (1) When𝛼 ≤ 𝛾, Lemma 1 implies that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞1
𝛾

















− 𝑞𝛾 + 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠











. So  𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) is decreasing in 𝑤1  and  𝑏 , and increasing in  𝑤2 . (2) 
When 𝛼 > 𝛾, Lemma 1 means that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞𝛾 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠











= −𝑞𝛼 + 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠











. It also shows 
 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) is decreasing in 𝑤1 and 𝑏, and increasing in 𝑤2.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: (1) When 𝛼 ≤ γ, 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾. Equation (1) shows that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) has nothing to do with 𝛼. 
(2) When 𝛼 > γ, 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞∗ − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
). From Equation (1), we have 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞
𝛼 −
(𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞𝛼
0


























. Since 𝑝 > 𝑤2, 𝑞





< 0, it implies 
that 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) is decreasing in 𝛼. Therefore,  𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) is non-increasing in the service constraints 𝛼. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: (1) When 𝛼 ≤ γ, 𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾. Equation (6) shows that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) has nothing to do 
with  𝛼 . (2) When  𝛼 > γ ,  𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 . From Equation (6), we have  𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) = ( 𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞



























From 𝑤2 + 𝑠 + 𝑏 > 𝑤2 + 𝑐 and 𝑠 > 0, we can get 𝑤2 + 𝑏 − 𝑐 > 𝑤2 − 𝑠. Since  𝑤2 + 𝑏 > 𝑐 and 𝑤2 > 𝑠, so it 
can be seen that  
  𝑤2+𝑏−𝑐
𝑤2−𝑠
> 1  and  
  𝑤2+𝑏−𝑐
𝑤2−𝑠




> 0 , it implies 
that 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) is increasing in 𝛼. Therefore, 𝜋𝑠(𝑄



























= 1. It implies that 𝛾 > 𝛽 . 
Therefore, we get 𝑞𝛾 > 𝑞0
𝛽
, that is,  𝑞∗ > 𝑞0
∗. (2) If 𝛽 ≤ 𝛼 <  𝛾, we see that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. Since 𝛼 < 𝛾, 
then  𝑞∗ > 𝑞0
∗. (3) If 𝛼 ≥  𝛾, it can be seen that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼, which indicates that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞0
∗.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽, 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞0
𝛽














𝑑𝑥 − 𝑏𝑞1  and 𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
𝛽
) = (𝑝 − 𝑤1)𝑞0
𝛽
−




𝑑𝑥 . Then, we obtain ∆(𝑞1) = 𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
𝛽
, 𝑞1) − 𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
𝛽














𝑑𝑥 . From  ∆(0) = 0 and  
𝑑∆(𝑞1)
𝑑𝑞1
|𝑞1=0 = (𝑤2 − 𝑠)𝐹(𝑞0
𝛽
) − 𝑏 =





] > 0, we know that ∆(𝑞1) > 0, i.e.  𝜋𝑟(𝑞0
𝛽
, 𝑞1) > 𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
𝛽




, 𝑞1), so we get 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
𝛾, 𝑞1) > 𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
𝛽



















) − 𝑏]  > 0, so we get ∆𝜋 is increases in 𝜎. Similarly, 
when 𝛽 < 𝛼 <  𝛾 and 𝛼 ≥  𝛾, we have the same results. ∎  
 
Proof of Proposition 5: Proposition 3 shows that if 𝛼 < 𝛾,  𝑞∗ > 𝑞0
∗. Since  𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗and 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗, we can 
get 𝑄∗ > 𝑄0
∗. However, it can be seen that  𝑞∗ = 𝑞0
∗ if 𝛼 ≥ 𝛾, which indicates that 𝑄∗ = 𝑄0
∗. ∎ 
 








∗ , let  ∆( 𝑤1) = 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) −  𝜋𝑠
0(𝑄0
∗) , we get ∆( 𝑤1) = ( 𝑤1 − 𝑐)(𝑞
𝛾 − 𝑞0
𝛽










𝑑𝑥 . Set  𝑤1
0 = 𝑝 −
𝑏(𝑝−𝑠)
 𝑤2−𝑠
. If  𝑤1 = 𝑤1





) . It follows 
that  ∆(𝑤1










. From  𝑤1
0 > 𝑐 ,   𝑤2 > 𝑠 
and  𝑓 [𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
)] > 0 , we can get
𝑑∆( 𝑤1)
𝑑 𝑤1
| 𝑤1=𝑤10 < 0 . Since  𝑤1 < 𝑤1
0 , we obtain that  ∆( 𝑤1) > 0 , 
i.e. 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) >  𝜋𝑠
0(𝑄0
∗). 
(2) When 𝛽 < 𝛼 <  𝛾,  𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. In this case, we get ∆( 𝑤1) = ( 𝑤1 − 𝑐)(𝑞
𝛾 −
𝑞𝛼) + 𝑏 [𝑞𝛾 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠






















< 0, it indicates that ∆( 𝑤1) is decreasing in 𝛼. According to case (1), when  𝛼 = 𝛽 , we 
have   ∆( 𝑤1) > 0 . Furthermore, let 𝛤( 𝑤1) = 𝑏 [𝑞
𝛾 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠






𝑑𝑥 . Then 
∆( 𝑤1) = ( 𝑤1 − 𝑐)(𝑞
𝛾 − 𝑞𝛼) + 𝛤( 𝑤1) and 
𝑑Γ(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1






. From equation (9) and 𝑏 <
(𝑝−𝑤1)(𝑤2−𝑠)
𝑝−𝑠





. Besides, from equation (2) and  𝑞𝛾 > 𝑞0
𝛽
, we have  𝐹(𝑞𝛾) > 𝐹(𝑞0
𝛽
) . 
Therefore, we get  𝐹(𝑞𝛾) >
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
; Since 𝑤2 > 𝑠, 
𝑑𝑞𝛾
𝑑𝑤1
< 0, so we see that 
𝑑Γ(𝑤1)
𝑑𝑤1
> 0, it implies that Γ( 𝑤1) is 
increasing in 𝑤1 . From 𝛤( 𝑤1) = 0 and  𝑤1 < 𝑤1
0 , we can see that Γ( 𝑤1) < 0. If 𝛼 =  𝛾 , it’s easy to get 
that ∆( 𝑤1) = 𝛤( 𝑤1) < 0, while if 𝛼 =  𝛽, then ∆( 𝑤1) > 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is 𝛼0 ∈
(𝛽, 𝛾), if 𝛼 = 𝛼0, then ∆( 𝑤1) = 0, i.e. 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) =  𝜋𝑠
0(𝑄0
∗). Since ∆( 𝑤1) is decreasing in 𝛼, so if  𝛽 < 𝛼 < 𝛼0, 
then ∆( 𝑤1) > 0  i.e.  𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) >  𝜋𝑠
0(𝑄0





(3) When  𝛼 ≥ γ ,  𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛼  and  𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼 , and  ∆(𝑤2) = 𝑏 [𝑞
𝛼 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠











+ 𝑠 , if  𝑤2 = 𝑤2
0 , then  𝑞𝛼 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
)  It follows that ∆(𝑤2





















< 0. So ∆(𝑤2) is 
concave in  𝑤2  and a unique optimal solution  exists, that is,  ∆(𝑤2) = 0 . Since  𝑤2 > 𝑤2
0 , so we know 
that ∆(𝑤2) < 0, i.e. 𝜋𝑠(𝑄




Proof of Proposition 7: Set ∆𝜋𝑟 = 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) −  𝜋𝑟
0(𝑞0
∗) and ∆𝜋𝑠 = 𝜋𝑠(𝑄
∗) − 𝜋𝑠
0(𝑄0
∗), we will discuss the 
value of ∆𝜋𝑟 + ∆𝜋𝑠 in three different cases below. Case 1: When 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼0, Proposition 4 and 6 show that 
𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1





∗). It is safe to confirm that ∆𝜋𝑟 + ∆𝜋𝑠 > 0. Case 2: When 𝛼0 < 𝛼 <
γ, Lemma 1 indicates that 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾, and Equation (9) shows that 𝑞0
∗ =  𝑞𝛼. From Equation (1) and (7), we get 
∆𝜋𝑟 = (𝑝 − 𝑤1𝑔)(𝑞
𝛾 −  𝑞𝛼) + (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
 𝑞𝛼
0
𝑑𝑥 − (𝑝 − 𝑤2) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞𝛾
0






𝑏 [𝑞𝛾 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠
)]. Because 𝑄∗ = 𝑞∗ = 𝑞𝛾,  𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞0
∗ =  𝑞𝛼 and 𝜋𝑠(𝑄0
∗) = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)𝑞0
∗, then from Equation 
(6), we have ∆𝜋𝑠 = (𝑤1 − 𝑐)(𝑞
𝛾 −  𝑞𝛼) + 𝑏 [𝑞𝛾 − 𝐹−1 (
𝑏
𝑤2−𝑠






. So, ∆𝜋𝑟 +
∆𝜋𝑠 = (𝑝 − 𝑐)(𝑞
𝛾 −  𝑞𝛼) + (𝑝 − 𝑠) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
 𝑞𝛼
𝑞𝛾
𝑑𝑥  and  
𝑑(∆𝜋𝑟+∆𝜋𝑠)
𝑑𝛼






. From  𝐹(𝑞𝛼) <
(𝑝 − 𝑐) (𝑝 − 𝑠)⁄ , 𝑝 > 𝑠, and 𝑑𝑞𝛼 𝑑𝛼⁄ > 0, we have 
𝑑(∆𝜋𝑟+∆𝜋𝑠)
𝑑𝛼




∆𝜋𝑠 = 0. Therefore, ∆𝜋𝑟 + ∆𝜋𝑠 > 0 when 𝛼0 < 𝛼 < γ. Case 3: When 𝛼 ≥ 𝛾, we can see that 𝑞
∗ = 𝑞0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. In 








∗); when 𝛼 ≥ 𝛾, 𝜋𝑟(𝑞
∗, 𝑞1
∗) + 𝜋𝑠(𝑄






Proof of Proposition 8: Because 𝑏 <
(𝑝−𝑤1)(𝑤2−𝑠)
𝑝−𝑠






















> 0, which implies that 𝛾 < 𝜏. Therefore, we have 𝛽 < 𝛾 < 𝜏. 
From Lemma 1, Equation (5), (10) and (14), we get (1) if 𝛼 ≤ 𝛽, 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞𝛽,  𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑞𝜏. (2) if 𝛽 <
𝛼 ≤ 𝛾, 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑞𝛼,  𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛾 and 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑞𝜏. (3) if 𝛾 < 𝛼 < 𝜏, 𝑄0
∗ =  𝑄∗ = 𝑞𝛼and 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑞𝜏. (4) if 𝛼 ≥ 𝜏, 𝑄0
∗ =
Q∗ = 𝑄𝐼
∗ = 𝑞𝛼. The analysis above show that 𝑄0
∗ < 𝑄∗ < 𝑄𝐼
∗ if 𝛼 < 𝜏, which means that the optimal production 
quantity of the supplier in two cases (with and without put option contract) are always less than that of the 
integrated supply chain. It further indicates that the supply chain coordination cannot be achieved in both cases. 
However, if 𝛼 ≥ 𝜏, we can see that 𝑄0
∗ = 𝑄∗ = 𝑄𝐼
𝜏 , which means that the optimal production quantity of the 
supplier in two cases are always equal to that of the integrated supply chain. It further indicates that the supply 
chain coordination can be achieved in both cases. ∎ 
 
